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This paper addresses the key determinants of acquisition entry strategy (i.e. the choice between full vs. partial 
acquisition) of Nordic multinational enterprises (MNEs) in China. Although, general establishment and entry mode 
strategies have been a highly researched area in international business (IB) studies, acquisitions as a specific entry 
strategy and its different aspects have been scarcely researched. Therefore, the current study aim to fill the gap in 
literature by analyzing determinants of acquisition entry strategy based on three important theoretical bases, i.e. 
transaction cost economics, resource-based view and institutional theory. The current paper is also first study to analyze 
acquisition entry strategy of MNEs from all four Nordic economies (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) in China 
during 1987-2012, and this unique empirical context adds further value to the study findings. The empirical results 
show that high target country experience, high cultural distance, high level of product diversification and subsidiary 
location in institutionally developed and open cities of China were positively associated to choice of full acquisitions 
by Nordic MNEs. On the other hand, high industry R&D intensity, and timing of acquisition lead to the choice of 
partial acquisitions by the investing Nordic MNEs. 
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) strategy of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is one of the most 
important and often researched topics in international business (IB) and management studies 
(Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Slangen & Hennart, 2008; Demirbag et al., 2008, 2009). MNEs face 
two important strategic questions while deciding their market entry FDI strategy; firstly, whether 
to acquire an existing enterprise (acquisition) or establish a new start up from scratch (greenfield 
investment) and secondly, whether to form wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) or a joint venture (JV) 
with local partner (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Dikova & van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Slangen & 
Hennart, 2008; Arslan & Larimo, 2011).  IB researchers have analyzed FDI entry strategies of 
MNEs using a variety of theoretical and empirical approaches as well as concentrating on different 
aspects of these strategies.  
 
Some past studies analyzed the choice between greenfield investment and acquisition entry strategy 
by the investing foreign MNEs (e.g. Hennart & Park, 1993; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Datta et 
al., 2002; Larimo, 2003; Shimizu et al., 2004; Slangen & Hennart, 2008; Demirbag et al., 2008, 
2009; Arslan & Larimo, 2011). Other IB studies addressed the ownership mode strategy of MNEs 
by studying the choice between WOS or a JV formation (e.g. Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Luo, 
2001; Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Jung et al., 2008; Arslan & Larimo, 2010). However, the 
literature review reveals that very few IB and market entry studies (e.g. Jakobsen & Meyer, 2008; 
Arslan & Larimo, 2012) have analyzed acquisition entry strategy of MNEs specifically by 
differentiating between full acquisitions vs. partial acquisitions, in case the MNE decides to acquire 
a local firm at time of market entry in a new target country. Although, some previous studies 
mention that acquisitions can be difficult to manage compared to greenfield investments (e.g. Datta 
et al., 2002; Slangen & Hennart, 2008), but acquisitions have also been found suffer less from 
liability of foreignness and newness compared to the greenfield subsidiaries (e.g. Pablo & Javidan, 
2004). Therefore, acquisitions can be presumed as a preferred entry strategy of investing MNEs in 
order to gain relatively quick foothold in local market by accessing needed local networks, as well 
as avoid problems associated with liability of foreignness and newness associated with a greenfield 
subsidiaries established by foreign MNE (Arslan & Larimo, 2012).   
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It is also important to refer that lack of studies differentiating between full and partial acquisition 
in past explains the variance in findings of studies addressing establishment and ownership mode 
strategies of MNEs (e.g. Chen, 2008; Jakobsen & Meyer, 2008). As a result, important features 
that are unique to acquisition entry strategy have been ignored in previous IB studies due to the 
tendency to analyze full and partial acquisitions together whether those studies addressed the 
establishment mode or ownership mode strategies of MNEs (Chen, 2008; Chen & Hennart, 2004). 
Full acquisitions offer unified ownership of the target and majority control rights to exploit and 
integrate the combined resource base, while partial acquisitions offer limited ownership and 
minority control rights (Chen, 2008). Although, full acquisitions require high investments in human, 
physical and intangible assets, and greater overall commitment, they also offer the advantage of 
full control over acquired firm for the foreign MNE. On the other hand, partial acquisitions require 
rather limited resource commitments and control mechanisms and are prone to less transaction and 
governance costs but higher internal organizational costs (Chen & Hennart, 2004; Chen, 2008). 
Moreover, the foreign MNEs opting for partial acquisition entry strategy retain the flexibility of 
enhancing equity stake in their targets, as they continue to accumulate post-acquisition market 
knowledge and the acquired business entity (Shimizu et al., 2004). However, as mentioned earlier 
that previous studies have scarcely analyzed full vs. partial acquisition choice in detail, though 
acquisition entry strategy is increasingly popular in many emerging economies due to market 
economy reforms and removal of restrictions on acquiring local firms (Lin, 2000; Chen, 2008; 
Arslan & Larimo, 2012). Therefore, the current paper aims to fill that gap in IB literature by 
concentrating on the choice between full and partial acquisition of the MNEs and analyzing the 
key determinants of this important market entry strategy of MNEs. 
 
It has been referred by the scholars that IB as a research area is multidisciplinary in nature, where 
many theoretical perspectives are applicable (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Slangen & Hennart, 
2008). Moreover, IB entry mode decisions and strategies have been analyzed in many cases by 
using multiple theoretical frameworks, with transaction cost economics (TCE), resource-based 
view (RBV) and institutional theory emerging as the most often and commonly used ones (Meyer 
& Peng, 2005; Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Slangen & Hennart, 2007; Larimo & Arslan, 2013).  
Therefore, our paper tries to analyze the key determinants of acquisitions entry strategy of MNEs 
based on TCE, RBV and institutional theory. Our choice of using all these theories together is 
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further signified by the fact that TCE, RBV and institutional theory have been operationalized by 
a similar range of variables in the past IB and market entry mode analysis studies (e.g. Claver & 
Quer, 2005; Brouthers and& Hennart, 2007; Dikova & van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Dikova et al., 
2010; Arslan & Larimo, 2010, 2011, 2012; Demirbag et al., 2011; Dikova, 2012; Larimo & Arslan, 
2013). Consequently, we also deem it important for our study concentrating on acquisition entry 
strategy of the firms to integrate theoretical arguments from all three above mentioned theories. 
Our study attempts to adapt a rather comprehensive approach, and consequently, it theoretically 
advances market entry literature as it is one of the first to hypothesize and analyze different key 
determinants of acquisition entry strategy of MNEs.  
 
The empirical part of the study uses a relatively unique sample of the acquisitions made by the 
MNEs originating in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (i.e. Nordic economies) in the 
Chinese market in order to test the hypotheses. The literature review reveals that earlier Arslan and 
Larimo (2012) analyzed acquisition entry strategy of MNEs from Nordic region. However, they 
only concentrated on institutional pressures as being key determinant and their empirical sample 
was limited to acquisitions by only Finnish MNEs in different emerging economies. We believe 
that use of Nordic sample in our study as well as theoretical diversity enhances the study’s values 
as well as increases the generalizability of the findings. It should be noted that since China opened 
its door to foreign investments in 1979, there has been a rapid growth of FDI inflows as well as 
MNE operations there (Lin, 2000; Huang, 2008). As a result, China is now among one of the top 
FDI recipients in the globe and is the biggest foreign investment destination in Asia.  Moreover, as 
Chinese government removed restrictions on acquisitions (both full and partial acquisitions) of 
local firms, the number of acquisitions by foreign MNEs using acquisitions as entry mode has 
increased as depicted in the following figure 1. Therefore, this unique empirical context further 




Insert Figure 1 here 
Our paper starts with brief theoretical discussion leading to the development of study hypotheses. 
The next section addresses methodology, data and sample discussion followed by analysis and 
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discussion of study findings. The paper concludes with discussion concerning study limitations as 
well as managerial implications and future research directions. 
 
2. THEORETICAL DISCUSSION AND STUDY HYPOTHESES 
 
Past IB studies mention that several firm, industry and target country related variables are important 
for both FDI establishment and ownership mode strategies of the MNEs (Luo, 2001; Slangen & 
Hennart, 2008; Morschett et al., 2010).  It has been mentioned earlier in the current paper that most 
of the previous market entry studies have used TCE, RBV and institutional theory to analyze FDI 
ownership mode choices of the firms. Meyer and Peng (2005) in their review paper concentrating 
on management and IB strategies in transition economies also found that mostly these three theories 
were used by the researchers analyzing market entry mode strategies. They further observed that 
due to specific nature of changes in transition economies, there is a need by the researchers to adopt 
more comprehensive theoretical approach by integrating arguments from these theories while 
analyzing different IB and market entry strategies. We also support this observation by arguing that 
it is important to integrate key determinants of acquisition entry strategy of MNEs in important and 
economically attractive emerging economy of China. So far, no previous research (at least to our 
knowledge) concentrating on China has analyzed the key determinants of acquisition entry strategy 
based on these three theoretical bases, i.e. TCE, RCV and institutional theory. It is further important 
to note that certain variables like R&D intensity, international experience, target country 
experience, economic growth, degree of product diversification, cultural distance, transition and 
institutional advancement in the target country have been used as key indicators in studies that 
utilized TCE, RBV as well as institutional theory as their theoretical bases for entry mode related 
choices analysis (see e.g. Hill et al., 1990; Claver & Quer, 2005; Dikova & van Witteloostuijn, 
2007; Arslan & Larimo, 2010, 2011, 2012; Demirbag et al., 2008, 2009, 2011; Dikova, 2012; 
Larimo & Arslan, 2013). Therefore, we have incorporated these determinants found significant in 
past IB studies in our analysis by addressing them together in the context of acquisition entry 
strategy of the Nordic MNEs in China. 
We present the relevant theoretical discussion that leads to development of study hypotheses in 




Industry R&D intensity: Research and Development (R&D) intensity has been used in past IB 
studies using TCE as theoretical base to address the concept of asset specificity (Zhao et al., 2004). 
It has been established in past IB literature that MNEs with a high level of R&D intensity are likely 
to exploit significant amount of knowledge to international markets (e.g. Slangen & Hennart, 2007).  
This knowledge is also an integral part of RBV, where Barney (1991) referred to importance of 
knowledge in firm’s strategies both domestic and global.  
 
It should be further noted that MNEs operating in industry with high level of R&D intensity are 
likely to transfer significant amount of knowledge to their subsidiaries. However, if these 
subsidiaries are the result of acquisition of local firms, then the management problems can be 
significant for foreign MNEs (Hennart & Park, 1993; Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006). The foreign 
MNEs can be further expected to face great difficulties in pricing the technology and enforcing the 
contracts in case of a joint establishment (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1991) i.e. partial 
acquisition, in case of market entry via acquisition mode. Past literature further establishes that 
MNEs with high R&D expenses tend to prefer full ownership in order to completely control their 
proprietary know-how as well as best exploit such know-how in their international markets (e.g. 
Padmanabhan & Cho, 1996). The results of past IB studies specifically focusing on China further 
support the view that high industry R&D intensity tend to increase the probability of firms to 
choose full ownership rather than shared ownership in their subsidiaries (Chiao et al., 2010; Huang, 
2008).  We argue in the current paper that for a Nordic MNE operating in high R&D intensity 
industries, full acquisition is more preferable option that partial acquisition in case it uses 
acquisition as entry mode to China. Therefore, we hypothesize 
 
Hypothesis 1: High industry R&D intensity is positively associated with the propensity of Nordic 
MNEs to choose full acquisitions in China. 
 
International experience: Knowledge about how to successfully operate internationally is tacit in 
nature and is largely developed through experience (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). This kind of 
knowledge can be considered an essential part of RBV as it plays a major role in international 
performance of MNEs.  International experience has been referred to as an important factor in the 
entry mode choice by many MNE studies (e.g. Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1991; 
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Brouthers & Brouthers, 2001; Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). The familiarity with the target country 
or other similar international markets can reduce MNEs’ uncertainty (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 
Meyer & Tran, 2006), and can also influence acquisition strategy. However it is important to note 
that past IB studies have reported mixed findings with regard to the effect of international 
experience on entry strategy of MNEs. Several studies such as Padmanabhan & Cho (1999), Shi et 
al. (2001), Claver & Quer (2005) and Arslan & Larimo (2010) have indicated non-significant 
relationship between international experience and choice of ownership. However, in some China 
specific studies, international experience has been found to be positively associated with the 
probability of Taiwanese firms to choose full ownership (e.g. Chiao et al., 2010). We argue in this 
paper that in case the internationally experienced Nordic MNEs choose acquisition as entry mode 
to China, full acquisition appears as more probably option than the partial acquisition because 
operations in multiple markets develop a general structural ability to adapt (Tallman & Fladmoe-
Lindquist, 2002) as well as manage the idiosyncrasies of new international markets (Delios & 
Henisz, 2003; Eden & Miller, 2004). Therefore, we hypothesize:   
 
Hypothesis 2: High international experience is positively associated with the propensity of Nordic 
MNEs to choose full acquisitions in China. 
 
Target country experience: Previous IB studies using both TCE and RBV theories referred to the 
importance of host country experience also along with general international experience for the 
analysis of market entry mode strategy of the MNEs (e.g. Dowell & Killaly, 2009). Foreign MNEs 
with no or relatively less experience of operations in a particular market tend to lack the knowledge 
of local conditions (Hennart, 1991). Local firms develop and accumulate this market knowledge 
through doing business in the local market as well as understanding local market conditions and 
dynamics clearly. Local market knowledge is therefore embedded in the local firm and is costly to 
replicate or to purchase (Hennart & Park, 1993).  Past IB studies also refer that MNEs with prior 
investment experience in the target country tend to accumulate such knowledge and therefore tend 
to be less dependent on local partner. Consequently, these firms are less likely to share the 
ownership of the subsidiary with local partners (Arslan & Larimo, 2010); thereby increased 
preference of full acquisition in case of using acquisition entry strategy. Hennart (1991) found that 
Japanese investors having greater target country (U.S in this case.) experience are more likely to 
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choose full ownership over shared ownership. Moreover, several past China-focused empirical IB 
studies (Luo, 2001, Claver & Quer, 2005 Wei et al., 2005) also found full ownership of the Chinese 
subsidiary of MNEs linked to high host country experience. As, there is no previous study 
specifically analyzing acquisition entry strategy of MNEs in China in relation to host country 
experience, we follow the logic presented by above mentioned past ownership focused IB studies. 
Therefore, based on the above discussion, we hypothesize:   
 
Hypothesis 3: High target country experience is positively associated with the propensity of Nordic 
MNEs to choose full acquisitions in China. 
 
Cultural distance between home and target country: Cultural distance has been referred as the 
difference in national culture characteristics of the home and of the host country in IB studies 
(Hennart & Larimo, 1998). In general, the larger the cultural distance between the home and host 
country, the more costly it is for MNEs to transfer intangible assets such as organizational and 
managerial practices to their subsidiaries located in host country (Slangen & Hennart, 2007). 
Acquisitions in culturally distant countries offer certain advantages like less liability of foreignness 
(Eden & Miller, 2004), as well as costs associated with post acquisition integration of workforce 
used to different practices (Arslan & Larimo, 2011). The relationship of cultural distance and entry 
strategies can be analyzed in the context of investing foreign MNE’s need for the risk reduction by 
several past IB studies (e.g. Kogut & Singh, 1988; Tihanyi et al., 2005). From this perspective, the 
MNEs operating in culturally distant target countries often require greater flexibility in their 
strategies as well as operations, which can be achieved via shared ownership arrangement with a 
local partner (Tihanyi et al., 2005). Moreover, in China-focused past studies, Sun (1999) and Wei 
et al. (2005) found empirical supports for the negative association between cultural distance and 
choice of full ownership. Further on, in studies by Luo (2001) and Chen and Hu (2002), cultural 
distance is found to be non-significantly associated with entry strategy of investing firms in China. 
As, there is no previous IB study specifically analyzing acquisition entry strategy of MNEs in China 
and the influences of cultural distance on it, we follow argumentation of above mentioned past 
establishment and ownership strategy focused IB studies. Therefore, based on the above discussion, 




Hypothesis 4: High cultural distance is negatively associated with the propensity of Nordic MNEs 
to choose full acquisitions in China.  
 
Economic growth in the target country: The attractiveness of a target market is an important 
indicator of FDI flow as well as key determinant of FDI strategies of investing MNEs in a particular 
economy according to TCE (Hennart, 1982, 1991; Larimo & Arslan, 2013). In past IB studies, the 
attractiveness of target market has been conceptualized using economic growth in that target 
country (e.g. Hill et al., 1990; Hennart & Larimo, 1998; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Arslan & Larimo, 
2010).  Following TCE reasoning, high economic growth in the target country should motivate the 
investing MNEs to opt for full ownership (Morschett et al., 2010) i.e. full acquisitions, in case 
acquisitions are used as entry strategy. In past IB studies focusing specifically on China Lu, 
Karpova and Fiore (2011) pointed out that economic growth in China increased the probability of 
foreign MNEs to opt for full ownership. Finally, the only study specifically analyzing acquisition 
entry strategy of firms from Nordic region also found a positive relationship between the choice of 
full acquisition and high economic growth in the target country (Arslan & Larimo, 2012). Based, 
on the above discussion, we hypothesize  
 
Hypothesis 5: High target country economic growth is positively associated with the propensity 
of Nordic firms to choose full acquisition in China.  
 
Degree of product diversification:  A key issue addressed in TCE as well as RBV is uncertainty 
which has been found to influence different market entry strategies of MNEs (e.g. Mudambi & 
Mudambi, 2002; Larimo, 2003; Tihanyi et al., 2005; Slangen & Hennart, 2008; Dikova, 2012).  In 
order to reduce the uncertainties associated with foreign market entry, IB literature refers to the 
degree of product diversification of MNEs which is also an important indicator for their market 
entry strategies (e.g. Mudambi & Mudambi, 2002; Tihanyi et al. 2005; Larimo & Arslan, 2013). 
Firm’s product diversification is generally defined using 3-digit or 4-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes (Palepu, 1985; Mudambi & Mudambi, 2002; Larimo & Arslan, 2013).  
 
Past IB studies have referred that diversification offers MNEs the opportunities to obtain new 
resources and transfer their core competencies to new markets (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Kobrin, 
9 
 
1991). These benefits tend to result in higher MNE performance and positive returns (Gomes & 
Ramaswamy, 1999). It has been referred in IB studies that the highly concentrated firms more 
commonly own the needed product-specific knowledge (Burget & Murray, 2000). Therefore, based 
on TCE reasoning, there is less need for a partner in foreign subsidiaries of such MNEs because 
they have the required knowledge top operate their core businesses (Larimo & Arslan, 2013). When 
the degree of diversification of the MNEs increase, the lack of product-specific knowledge in 
different industries of their operations becomes evident which increases importance of having a 
partner in subsidiary management. Such product-specific knowledge is experiential and largely 
tacit (Slangen & Hennart, 2007), and therefore it is costly to replicate such knowledge internally 
and hardly to purchase in market (Hennart, 1991). Therefore, it can be expected that the firms 
having more diversified operations may find partial ownership mode being more efficient tool to 
access such product-specific knowledge as mentioned in the studies (e.g. Mudambi & Mudambi, 
2002; Tihanyi et al., 2003). The impact of degree of diversification on acquisition entry strategy 
has not been analyzed in any past IB studies.  However, based on the discussion presented above, 
we hypothesize that  
 
Hypothesis 6: High degree of product diversification of investing MNEs is negatively associated 
with the propensity of Nordic firms to choose full acquisition in China.  
 
Market economy institutional advancement and timing of acquisition: FDI strategies of 
internationalizing firms are considerably influenced by the development and effectiveness of 
market economy institutions of their host countries (e.g. Peng, 2003; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Peng 
& Khoury, 2009). An important issue to note while analyzing MNEs’ entry strategies in emerging 
economies like China related to timing as they have had different levels of market economy 
institutional development during different time periods (Peng, 2003; Peng et al., 2008). During the 
early phase of transition and development of market economy, China was characterized by 
government intervention for business operations, lack of reliable business information and weak 
intellectual property protection (Lin, 2000; Luo, 2001; Wei et al., 2005; Chung & Beamish, 2005). 
Moreover, during early stages of transition, Chinese government also tended to discourage and 
restrict acquisitions and full ownership modes in most industries, while offering incentives for 
greenfield joint establishments (Lin, 2000; Huang, 2008). However, in later phase of transition, the 
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market economy institutions strengthened as well as restrictions on acquisitions by the foreign 
MNEs slowly reduced that even some foreign MNEs were able to acquire some state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (Norton & Chao, 2001). SOEs in China were suffered from low efficiency and 
huge losses. The policy of “grasp the large, release the small” in China allowed foreign investors 
to acquire small and medium sized (SMEs) Chinese enterprises as Chinese government imposed 
relatively little control over private enterprises since late 1990s, MNEs had a greater opportunity 
to acquire private enterprises in China (Teng, 2004). 
 
The previous IB literature shows clearly that restrictions on level of foreign ownership tend to 
discourage full ownership modes by the investing MNEs (e.g. Gomes-Casseres, 1989, 1990; 
Makino & Beamish, 1998; Delios & Beamish, 1999; Arslan, 2012). On the other hand, the results 
by Child and Tsai (2005) indicate that when firms operate favorable external circumstances, they 
tend to commit more resources to the target country and may prefer the formation of wholly owned 
establishments (whether greenfield investments or acquisitions). In case of China, the gradual 
transition to market economy is also expected to result in increased acceptance and legitimacy for 
fully foreign owned establishments (Li et al., 2007).  Based on the above discussion, we argue in 
this paper that in later phases transition (2002-onwards, based on China’s accession to WTO in 
2001), full acquisitions are more probable compared to early phases (pre-2002) due to 
strengthening of market economy institutions and lesser restrictions in China. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that 
 
Hypothesis 7: Timing of acquisition is negatively associated with the propensity of Nordic firms 
to choose full acquisition in China. 
 
Subsidiary location: There is a considerable difference in restrictions on operations of foreign 
MNEs and institutional development in different regions of emerging economies (Peng et al., 2008). 
In case of China, a key feature of development of market economy has been the growth of open 
cities/special economic zones, where the restriction of foreign MNEs tended to be far lower than 
the rest of the country (Lin, 2000; Luo, 2000). In 1980, China designated Shenzhen, Zhuhai and 
Shantou within Guangdong province and Xiamen within Fujian province as Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs). The intention of the Chinese government was to use SEZs to attract foreign 
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investments, expand exports and infusion of advanced technology. SEZs were encouraged to 
implement pragmatic and open economic policies. Because of the success of the SEZs, in 1984, 
Chinese government decided to further open its economy by extending similar policies to fourteen 
coastal cities. In 1985, the open cities were extended to Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta 
and Min Delta in Fujian. In 1988, the entire Hainan province was designated as a fifth special 
economic zone. In order to further attract foreign investments in Yangtze River Delta, Shanghai 
Pudong new district was created in 1990 (Yeung et al., 2009).  
 
World Bank survey of 120 Chinese cities (2006) have shown that both of the overall investment 
climate and local government effectiveness and efficiency in SEZs and open coastal cities were 
ranked in the top quintile of all surveyed cities. On the other hand, the quintile of cities ranked 
lowest was all located within inland of China. In addition, MNEs operating in SEZs/open coastal 
cities receives preferential corporate tax rate, which was generally lower than other enterprises. 
Moreover, although laws and regulations were consistent at the nation level, the time spent on 
interactions with the local government differed across regions. Compared to foreign firms 
operating in interior cities in China, MNEs doing business in SEZs/open coastal cities spend less 
time with local government. In past China focused studies, Sun (1999), Luo (2001) and Wei et al. 
(2005) found the empirical supports for the positive relationship between subsidiary located in 
SEZ/open coastal cities and the choice of full ownership mode. As there are no prior studies 
specifically linked subsidiary location with full vs. partial acquisitions, we follow the augments 
and discussions presented by the above mentioned earlier China focused studies. Therefore, we 
propose that:  
 
Hypothesis 8: Subsidiary location in SEZs/open coastal cities is positively associated with the 









3. METHODOLOGY, SAMPLE, AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES 
 
3.1. Statistical method  
Since, the dependent variable in this study is dichotomous (i.e. full vs. partial acquisition), binary 
logistic regression analysis was employed to analyze the impact of the selected variables on the 
acquisition entry strategy of Nordic MNEs. Binary logistic regression has been used often as a 
reliable statistical analysis technique in past IB studies addressing different aspects of entry mode 
strategies generally (e.g. Hennart & Larimo, 1998; Larimo, 2003; Dikova & van Witteloostuijn, 
2007; Kaynak et al., 2007; Demirbag et al., 2009) as well as acquisition entry strategy of MNEs 
specifically (e.g. Arslan & Larimo, 2012).  Therefore, the current study also employs binomial 
logistic regression for the statistical analysis of acquisition entry strategy of Nordic MNEs in China.  
 
Binomial logistic regression model is formally expressed as 
 
P (yi=1) = 1/ 1+ exp (-a-XiB) 
 
Where yi is the dependent variable, Xi is the vector of independent variables for the ith observation, 
a is the intercept parameter and B is the vector of regression coefficients (Amemiya, 1981). The 
recent version of SPSS i.e. PASW 21 is used for the binomial regression analysis in this study. The 
dependent variable has been coded with value 1 for full acquisition; therefore, therefore a positive 
regression coefficient indicates that a particular independent variable increases the probability of 
full acquisition choice by the investing MNEs. 
 
 
3.2. Sample description  
The empirical data for the study is based on the internal FDI consisting of FDI activities of Nordic 
MNEs. This databank has been developed and continuously updated since many years by the 
departmental researchers working on these research areas. It is based on stock exchange 
movements, the annual reports and press releases of the investing MNEs, but also supplemented 
with the data gathered from articles in leading local business magazines as well as direct contact 




We identified 413 FDIs made by Nordic MNEs in China during 1987-2012. 106 out of 413 FDIs 
are acquisitions, while 307 investments are greenfield startups. As, the study aims to address the 
acquisition entry strategy, our sample consists 106 acquisitions made in manufacturing sector made 
by 65 Nordic MNEs in China during 1987-2012.  
 
Table 1 offers detailed characteristics of study sample by indicating the ownership structure, 
country of origin of acquiring MNEs, industries of operations, industry R&D intensity, parent 
MNEs’ international and target country experience, timing of investment and subsidiary location. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
The table 1 shows that 62.3% of the investments were partial acquisitions, while 37.7% were full 
acquisitions. More than half of the acquisitions were made between 2002 and 2012, which is in 
line with increased activities of foreign MNEs in China, after it accession to WTO in 2001. A large 
proportion (68%) of the investments was located in the SEZs/open coastal cities. The sample 
included investments made in all two digit manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39), but almost 70% 
the sample were investments made in SIC 20 (food), SIC 26 (paper and paper related products), 
SIC 28 (chemicals), SIC 35 (machinery), and SIC 36 (electronics).  
 
3.3. Operationalization of variables  
The dependent variable in this study is captured by a dummy variable which receives one if the 
firm owned 80% or more of the subsidiary equity and zero if it owned at least 20%, but no more 
than 80%. The 80% cut-off point was used in several earlier studies (Delios & Makino, 2003; 
Papyrina, 2007). For the independent variables, research and development intensity is a 
categorical variable, where 1 stands for low-tech branch, 2 for medium-tech branch and 3 for high-
tech branch. International experience was measured by the number of foreign manufacturing 
investments preceding a subsidiary’s establishment. Target country experience was measured by 
the number of years since the first manufacturing investment of the parent firm in China. We 
measured cultural distance by Kogut and Singh (1988) composite index, which is based on is based 
on difference between four Nordic countries and China along four dimensions of culture identified 
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by Hofstede (1990). Economic growth was operationalized by GDP in the preceding year of the 
establishment of the subsidiary. Degree of product diversification of the investing MNEs was 
measured by the number of four-digit SIC codes in which the company was operating. A dummy 
variable was created for measuring timing of acquisitions, where 1 stands for investments made 
pre 2002 and 0 for investments made after 2001. Subsidiary location was measured by a dummy 
variable, where investments located in SEZs and / or open coastal cities were coded as 1 and 
investments made in other parts of China were given as 0. The operationalization of the 
independent variables, data sources, examples of earlier studies where similar operationalization 
has been used and expected signs are presented in Table 2. 
 
Insert Table 2 here  
 
In addition to the selected independent variables, we added five control variables: industry 
resource intensity, industry restrictions, industry concentration, industry sales growth and parent 
MNE size. We create a dummy variable which stands for one if the subsidiary’s main products are 
in a resource-intensity industry, i.e., food and beverage, textile, wood except furniture, paper and 
paper related products, rubber, stone and glass, and primary metals (Hennart, 1991), and zero for 
other industries. A dummy variable where 1 stands for restricted manufacturing business segments, 
i.e., production of complete cars, ordinary bearings and transformation and transmission systems 
and 0 for otherwise. In transition economies like China, both wholly-owned subsidiaries and 
acquisitions have been long restricted in strategic important industries (Teng, 2004). We therefore 
expect that industry restrictions should be negatively associated with full acquisitions. In past entry 
mode studies, scholars found that industry structures such as industry concentration and industry 
sales growth are important determinants of entry mode strategy of MNEs (Hennart & Park, 1993; 
Tihanyi et al., 2005; Dikova & van Witteloostuijn, 2007). Highly concentrated industries in 
transition economies like China signal greater government interventions and therefore the business 
opportunities in these industries are relatively less (Luo, 2001). Hence, the level of concentration 
should be negatively associated with the choice of full acquisitions. When the potential for sales in 
a particular industry is more stable and certain, parent MNEs are more likely to commit more 
resources (Luo, 2001). We therefore expect that industry sales growth increase the use of full 
acquisitions. The information of industry sales and number of firms in a given industry is drawn 
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from China Statistical Yearbook (1988-2009). Industry sales growth and industry concentration 
are calculated using the compound growth rate over three consecutive years prior to the 
establishment of the subsidiary (Luo, 2001). Further on, parent MNE size is measured by 
worldwide annual sales of the company (in million euros) in the year preceding the investment. 
Since large MNEs are able to provide adequate financial resources (Padmanabhan & Cho, 1996) 





Before running the logistic regression, a correlation analysis (see appendix) was conducted to 
detect any multicollinearity between various variables. A correlation analysis is conducted before 
logistic regression tests in order to detect any multicollinearity among independent variables. 
Following Belsley et al. (1980) and Pallant (2007), additional multicollinearity diagnostic 
(tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF)) was also conducted. According to Wetherill (1986), 
the VIF values for independent and control variables used in regression analysis should not exceed 
10. In our study, the VIF values are lower than 5 and thus, the potential multicollinearity among 
independent and control variables is not expected to influence the results of logistic regression 
analysis. 
 
Table 3 displays the results of binomial regression analysis for acquisition entry strategy of Nordic 
MNEs China. The explanatory power of the regression model is good, as the chi-square (x²) value 
is highly significant at p≤0.01 level. The predictive strength of the statistical models can be 
assessed by the correct classification rate. Regression model of our study has a higher correct 
classification rate than the chance rate of 52.8%, which is calculated using the proportional chance 
criterion which is a2 + (1-a)2, where a is a proportion of full acquisitions (38%) in our sample. The 
regression model of the study has correct classification rate 70.8%; therefore 18% increase in 
correct classification rates. Finally, good Nagelkerke R2 value of 0.340 also depicts rather 
significant predictive capability of our regression model. 
The study results show that out of chosen control variables, three are significant. Industry resource 
intensity is positively and significantly (p ≤ 0.05) associated with the probability of Nordic MNEs 
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to choose full acquisitions in China. Further on, the regression analysis shows that Nordic MNEs 
with subsidiaries in restricted manufacturing industries is significant at p≤0.10 level. The negative 
coefficient of industry restrictions suggest that Nordic MNEs prefer partial acquisitions when 
entering into strategically important industries. This is consistent with our expectation, as foreign 
firms are not able to own subsidiaries fully in those industries in China. Our results further indicate 
that high growth industries tend to increase the probability of Nordic MNEs to choose full 
acquisitions (p ≤ 0.05). This finding is consistent with our expectation that high industry sales 
encourage parent MNEs to choose full acquisitions to retain more profits in China, as well as show 
commitment for long term presence in this important market. Although, the coefficients of industry 
concentration and parent MNE size were not significant, the signs indicate that high number of 
firms and large parent MNEs increase the choice of full acquisitions.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
The regression results further depict that industry R&D intensity is mildly significant at p≤0.05 
level and the regression coefficient depicts that in industries with high R&D intensity, partial 
acquisitions have been preferred by Nordic MNEs. This finding is opposite to our hypothesis 1. 
However, we would like to mention that previous IB studies addressing this issue analyzed FDIs 
made in developed market economies, which are full of suitable acquisition targets (Hennart & 
Park, 1993), as well as full acquisitions are not restricted based on industry’s importance for the 
country. However, in case of China, certain industries (mostly technological and research intensive) 
have long been labeled as strategic industries where Chinese government wanted to develop local 
competencies via knowledge and technology transfer (Huang, 2008). Therefore, full ownership of 
foreign MNEs in these industries has been discouraged (Luo & Park, 2001). Hence, this finding is 
line with China specific context, where traditional TCE logic may sometimes fail to provide 
answers due to specific characteristics of Chinese capitalism (Huang, 2008).   
 
An interesting result concerns non-significance of international experience, while significance of 
target country experience (p ≤ 0.05) for acquisition entry strategy of the Nordic MNEs in China. 
We would like to explain this finding by referring to the fact that although, general international 
experience may offer MNEs increased capabilities of managing subsidiaries across cultures and 
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countries (Barkema et al., 1996; Larimo, 2003), this experience has less value for MNEs in 
emerging economies like China (Li & Meyer, 2009) due to their specific context as well as 
continuing transition to market economy.  However, in such cases, target country experience 
becomes more important for MNEs. The regression results show that high target country 
experience lead to the choice of full acquisitions by Nordic MNEs, which is in line with our 
hypothesis 3. This finding is in line with past IB studies that refer to knowledge acquisition of 
MNEs with prior investment experience in the target country and their less dependence on local 
partner (Hennart, 1991). Moreover, as most of the employees are still Chinese in the acquired firm, 
therefore, MNEs can still take advantage of local networks and integrate work practices with their 
global strategy (Dikova et al., 2010).  
 
The regression results further depict that cultural distance is significant at p≤0.05 level and high 
cultural distance lead to the choice of full acquisitions rather than partial acquisitions as 
hypothesized by us. We explain this finding by referring to the fact that cost and uncertainty in 
shared ownership structure are greater in culturally distant host countries due to volatility of the 
environment in the host country (Brouthers & Brouthers,  2000), especially if it is a transition 
economy like China. Therefore, full acquisition in this case offered Nordic MNEs increased control 
over their subsidiaries in order to minimize transaction costs (Hill et al., 1990), as well as manage 
the subsidiary efficiently by integrating local work practices with global strategy (Meyer & 
Altenborg, 2008) rather than dealing with problems associated with local partner in case of partial 
acquisition (Arslan & Larimo, 2012).  
 
The results further show that the level of product diversification of investing MNE is highly 
significant at p≤0.01 level and highly diversified Nordic MNEs tended to choose full acquisitions 
rather than partial acquisitions as hypothesized by us. This finding can be explained by referring 
to the specific characteristics of acquisition entry mode that have been ignored in past IB studies 
mostly as they concentrated on either establishment or ownership mode strategies of MNEs.  It has 
been referred in IB studies that when the degree of product diversification of the MNEs increase, 
the lack of product-specific knowledge in all fields of industries becomes evident which increases 
importance of having a partner in subsidiary management. Such product-specific knowledge is 
experiential and largely tacit (Slangen & Hennart, 2007), and therefore it is costly to replicate such 
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knowledge internally and hardly to purchase in market (Hennart, 1991). Hence, MNEs having more 
diversified operations may find collaborative entry modes being more efficient tool to access such 
product-specific knowledge as mentioned in the studies (e.g. Mudambi & Mudambi, 2002; Larimo 
& Arslan, 2013). However, in case of acquisition, investing Nordic MNEs already had access to 
local knowledge via the employees of acquired subsidiary. Therefore, their preference for full 
acquisition can be understandable as management of partial acquisition partnership in an emerging 
market economy can be problematic for Western MNEs (Meyer, 2002).  
 
We further observe that timing of acquisition is mildly significant at p≤0.10 and the results show 
that investments made prior to 2001 tend to partial acquisition while later investments tend to be 
full acquisition. This result is in line with hypothesis 7 and as a result it is accepted. It is important 
to mention that post 2000, the market economy institutions strengthened as well as restrictions on 
acquisitions by the foreign MNEs slowly reduced that even some foreign MNEs were able to 
acquire some SOEs (Norton & Chao, 2001) due to China’s accession to WTOS. SOEs in China 
were suffered from low efficiency and huge losses. Moreover, as Chinese government imposed 
relatively little control over private enterprises since late 1990s, MNEs had a greater opportunity 
to acquire private enterprises in China (Teng, 2004). Hence, the propensity of recent acquisition of 
Nordic MNEs to be full acquisition is logical and in line with development and strengthening of 
market economy institutions in China. 
 
Finally, the regression results also show that acquired subsidiaries located in SEZ’s tend to be full 
acquisitions. This finding provides support for hypothesis 8 and hence, we accept it. As, mentioned 
earlier a key feature of institutional reforms and development of market economy in China has 
been development of open cities/special economic zones, where the restriction of foreign MNEs 
tended to be far lower than the rest of the country (Luo, 2000). Moreover, this finding also 
strengthens the findings of past IB studies where empirical supports for the positive relationship 
between subsidiaries located in SEZ/open coastal cities and the choice of full ownership mode has 
been found (e.g. Luo, 2001; Wei et al., 2005). 
 




The purpose of the present study is to analyze the determinants of the choice between full and 
partial acquisitions of Nordic MNEs in China. Our analysis was based on a relatively unique dataset 
of 106 investments by 65 Nordic MNEs in China over 1987 to 2012. Drawing on the arguments 
from established IB theories of TCE, RBV and institutional theory, our study analyzed the 
determinants of acquisition entry strategy, i.e., choice of full vs. partial acquisition. We found that 
greater host country experience, high cultural distance, diversified parent MNEs, timing of 
investments (2002-2012) and subsidiary located in SEZs / OCCs are significant determinants of 
Nordic MNEs acquisition strategy. Our study pointed out that the amount of MNEs’ prior 
experience in China significantly increases their preferences to choose full acquisitions. As 
discussed above, this may be explained that there is less need for Nordic MNEs having greater 
business experience in China to rely on local partners (Hennart, 1991). However, in a recent study 
by Arslan and Larimo (2012), Finnish parent MNEs’ host country experience was not a significant 
determinant of full vs. partial acquisition strategy. Their sample contains investments made by 
selected emerging economies in CEE, Asia and Latin America, which we believe to be the reason 
for the difference between their result and our finding.  
 
This study also supported the view that timing of acquisitions in China increases the probability of 
Nordic parent MNEs to choose full acquisitions. A similar finding was also found in the study by 
Arslan and Larimo (2012) that when investing in selected economies in CEE, Asia and Latin 
America, Finnish MNEs are more likely to opt for full acquisitions. This can be explained by the 
transitions from planned to market economy in China. In the earlier phase of transitions, full 
ownership was discouraged by Chinese government. Consequently, parent MNEs preferred to opt 
for partial ownership strategy to avoid unnecessary government interventions. We further found 
that investments located in SEZs and / or OCCs increased the probability of Nordic MNEs to opt 
for full acquisitions. This result supported the notion that preferential host government policies 
enacted in open areas appear to encourage Nordic MNEs to choose full acquisitions in China.   
The result of our study has certain useful implications for the managers of Western and especially 
Nordic MNEs aspiring to enter Chinese market via acquisitions in the manufacturing sector. Firstly, 
it is important for them to analyze industry research and development intensity, target country 
experience, cultural distance, product diversification of MNEs, timing of acquisition and subsidiary 
location before making the decision concerning full or partial acquisition choice. Secondly, 
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institutional advancement and subsequent relaxations concerning majority ownership for foreign 
firms offers a useful opportunity for these MNEs to fully acquire the target company in China, so 
that they can easily align acquired subsidiary to their international strategy and organizational 
practices.   
 
Like all research projects, our study also has several limitations. Our study only included a sample 
of manufacturing investments made in China. Previous studies found that the determinants of entry 
mode strategy differ by types of industries, i.e., manufacturing and service industries (Brouthers & 
Brouthers, 2003). Future studies are encouraged to include service firms in their empirical analysis. 
Further on, our study analyzed acquisition entry strategy in a single emerging country (China). 
There are different patterns of institutional changes among different transition economies 
(Demirbag et al., 2008). Therefore, we suggest that future research may incorporate other emerging 
markets especially in Asia into their research design based on key determinants identified in this 




[1] According to OECD classifications, a branch is considered as high-tech if on average it spends 
at least 4 per cent of its value added for R&D. A branch uses on average 1 to 4 per cent is classified 
as medium-tech. The rest are low-tech branches. The following branches are classified as high-tech 
using the statistics provided by Nordic Statistical Secretariat: SIC 2833-2834, 3573-3574, 3579, 
36, 37, AND 38; Medium-tech branches are: all 28 except 2833 & 2834, 30, 3339, 3341, 3356-
3357, 3369, 35 except 3573-3574 and 3579, 39. The rest are classified as low-tech branches. 
[2] Special economic zones: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou in Guangdong province, Xiamen in Fujian 
province, and entire Hainan province. Open coastal cities: Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, 
Bohai Bay, Liaodong Peninsula, and Shandong Peninsula (Zhou, Delios, & Yang, 2002).   
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TABLE 1: Summary of sample characteristics 
 
Ownership structure: 
Partial acquisitions (66), Full acquisitions (40) 
Country of origin of investing MNEs:  
Denmark=27, full acquisitions=12 
Finland=28, full acquisitions=9 
Norway=15, full acquisitions=2 
Sweden=36, full acquisitions=17 
Timing of investment:  
1987-2001 (43) (full acquisitions=11),  
2002-2012 (63) (full acquisitions=29) 
Subsidiary location:  
SEZs/open coastal cities (72) (full acquisitions=29) 
Other cities (34) (full acquisitions=11) 
Manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39): 
Electronic (11), machinery (24), chemical (10), food 
(18), paper (10) 
Parent’s international experience:  
Minimum (1), Maximum (182),  
Mean (49.26) 
Parent’s target country experience: 
Minimum (0), Maximum (15),  
Mean (5.12) 
Industry R&D intensity of investing MNEs: 
High-tech branch (22) (full acquisitions=8),  
Medium-tech branch (36) (full acquisitions=14), 





TABLE 2. Operationalization of independent and control variables used in this study 
 
VARIABLES OPERATIONALIZATION REFERENCE(S) 
Independent variables   
Industry R&D intensity A classification of various 4-digit SIC industries into three 
categories based on their value added figures1 




International experience  The number of foreign manufacturing investments made by 
the company before the reviewed investment. 
 
Padmanabhan & Cho 
(1999); Larimo (2003); 
Arslan and Larimo 
(2011, 2012) 
 
Target country experience  The experience in years from the first manufacturing 
investment of the firm in the target country. 
Hennart and Park 
(1993); Padmanabhan 
and Cho (1999); Larimo 
(2003); Arslan and 
Larimo (2011, 2012) 
 
Cultural distance between home 
and target country 
Cultural distance is measured by Kogut & Singh (1988) 
composite index, which is based on difference between Nordic 
countries and China along four dimensions of culture 
identified by Hofstede (1980). 
 
Brouthers and Brouthers 
(2000); Larimo (2003); 
Demirbag et al. (2008) 
Economic growth in the target 
country 
 
Economic growth (% of GDP growth) in the target country of 
the investment in the preceding the investment (UNCTAD) 
Hennart (1991); 
Brouthers and Brouthers 
(2000); Arslan and 
Larimo (2010, 2011, 
2012) 
 
Degree of product 
diversification 
The number of 4-digit SIC codes in which the company was 
operating based on the annual reports and websites of the 
firms. 
Hennart and Larimo 
(1998); Mudambi and 
Mudambi (2002). 
   




A dummy variable where 1 stands for investments made pre 
2002 and 0 for after 2001 
Wei et al. (2005); Peng 
(2003) 
Subsidiary located in SEZs/open 
coastal areas  
 
A dummy variable where 1 stands for subsidiaries located in 
special economic zones (SEZs) and open coastal cities and 0 
for otherwise2  
Luo (2001) 
Control variables   
Resource intensive industry  A dummy variable where 1 indicates that the subsidiary’s 
main products are in a resource intensive industry and 0 for 
other industries.  
 
Hennart (1991) 
Industry restrictions A dummy variable where restricted manufacturing industries 
in China are coded as 1 and encouraged manufacturing 
industries are coded as 0.  
 
Chang et al. (2012) 
Industry concentration Compound growth rate in terms of number of firms over three 
consecutive years prior to the establishment of the subsidiary. 
 
Luo (2001) 
Industry sales growth Compound growth rate in terms of sales over three 
consecutive years prior to the establishment of the subsidiary. 
 
Luo (2001) 
Parent MNE size Worldwide annual sales of the company (in million euros) in 
the year preceding the investment.  
Taylor et al. (1998) 




TABLE 3. Binomial logistic regression estimates of acquisition strategy (full acquisition = 1) 
 
Variable Regression Coefficients 
R&D intensity -0.900** 
International experience -0.030 
Target country experience 0.069** 
Cultural distance 1.920** 
Economic growth -0.161 
Product diversification of MNE 0.162*** 
Timing of acquisition -1.703* 
Subsidiary location 0.367** 
Industry resource intensity 0.806** 
Industry restrictions -0.098* 
Industry concentration -4.4556 
Industry sales growth 1.310** 
Parent MNE size 0.001 
N (full acquisitions) 106 (40) 
Model x2 31.060*** 
–2 log likelihood 119.942 
Nagelkerke R2 0.340 
Correctly classified (%) 70.8% 




Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. ACQMODE 0.45 0.50 1                   
2. ELECTRONIC 0.10 0.31 -0.06 1                  
3. MACHINERY 0.23 0.42 0.05 -0.18 1                 
4. METAL 0.07 0.25 0.14 -0.09 0.14 1                
5. FOOD 0.17 0.38 -0.21* -0.15 -0.25* -0.12 1               
6. PAPER 0.09 0.29 -0.03 -0.11 -0.18 -0.09 -0.15 1              
7. INCONCEN 0.07 0.08 0.08 -0.00 0.10 0.03 -0.31** -0.09 1             
8. INGROWTH 0.20 0.18 0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.11 -0.01 -0.19 0.54**  1           
9. RND 1.75 0.78 0.02 0.55** 0.17 -0.26** -0.44** -0.31** 0.09  0.02 1          
10. INTEXP 49.80 38.39 -0.09 -0.21* -0.06 -0.11 0.18 0.10 0.18  0.28** -0.19 1         
11. TCEXP 5.21 4.40 0.10 -0.14 0.02 -0.13 0.20* 0.02 0.26**  0.34* -0.17 0.64** 1        
12. CULTDIS 5.24 0.81 0.00 -0.14 -0.03 -0.18 0.25** -0.31 0.08  0.05 0.02 0.13 0.14 1       
13. GDP 9.55 2.00 -0.14 -0.08 0.07 0.22 -0.15 0.00 0.40**  0.18 0.01 -0.12 -0.16 0.15 1      
14. DIVER 10.37 7.21 -0.05 -0.21 -0.11 0.01 0.23* 0.05 -0.05  0.12 -0.19 0.65** 0.28** -0.04 -0.00 1     
15. PSIZE 4780.41 4746.42 0.01 -0.15 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.16 0.17  0.07 -0.05 0.37** 0.20* 0.27** -0.03 0.21* 1    
16. LOCATION 0.68 0.47 0.10 0.17 -0.11 0.18 -0.17 0.01 0.01  -0.13 0.07 -0.22* -0.24* -0.08 0.04 -0.17 -0.00 1   
17. TIME 0.41 0.49 -0.21* 0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.07 0.06 -0.52**  -0.35** 0.06 -0.38** -0.63** -0.01 0.19* -0.00 -0.06 0.24* 1  









Appendix. Correlations between dependent, control and independent variables 
(N=106) 
 
